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BEYOND COPYRIGHT:
MANAGING INFORMATION RIGHTS WITH DRM
VIKTOR MAYER-SCHONBERGERt
INTRODUCTION
For the first 150 years of United States copyright law the legal pro-
hibition of unauthorized copying was aided by the technical limitations
consumers faced when wanting to duplicate content. The Xerox machine
made copying of paper-based content faster and less costly; so did the
widespread availability of audiocassette and videotape recorders. Yet, as
long as information remained stored in analog form, copying tended to
result in a loss of quality. The copy of the copy of a music cassette lacks
the fidelity of the original. To be sure, piracy existed even then, but it
did not happen primarily at the consumer end of the value chain. Pirates
generally required sophisticated and costly equipment and a functioning
distribution channel. Over time, rights holders improved their ability to
interdict pirates around the world.
Digital technology changed the historical status quo. Duplication
technology enabled consumers to make perfect copies for a fraction of
the cost and time. The Internet added a cheap and fast distribution chan-
nel with peer-to-peer software providing an unprecedented level of ease-
of-use in downloading copyrighted content. Rapidly, illegal copying
became much cheaper than doing so legally, leading to the widespread
"sharing" of copyrighted information among consumers without rights
holders' consent, thus-as rights holders contend-reducing market de-
mand for the informational goods they offer.'
Rights holders see digital rights management (DRM) as a tool to
rectify this situation using a double strategy. First, and much reported in
the media, DRM aims at making illegal copying harder and more costly.
2
Second, often overlooked but at least of equal importance, DRM is in-
t Associate Professor of Public Policy, The John F. Kennedy School of Government, Har-
vard University. I gratefully acknowledge the research assistance of Malte Ziewitz and financial
support from the Dean's Research Fund at the Kennedy School of Government.
I. See Press Release, Recording Indus. Ass'n of America, Music Industry Unveils New
Business Strategies and Combats Piracy During 2002 (Feb. 28, 2003), available at
http://www.riaa.com/news/newsletter/022803.asp (citing online piracy as a major cause of the 9%
decline in CD shipments in 2002); see also Stephen Manes, Full Disclosure: Copyright Law-Ignore
it at your own Peril, PC WORLD, Sept. 2003, available at http://www.pcworld.com/howto/article/
0,aid, 1 1657,00.asp. For an economic analysis, see Stan Liebowitz, File-Sharing: Creative Destruc-
tion or Just Plain Destruction?, 49 J.L. & EcON. 1, 17-18 (2006).
2. See, e.g., Amy Harmon, Pondering Value of Copyright vs. Innovation, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
3, 2003, at C2; Jeff Howe, Licensed to Bill, WIRED, Oct. 2001, at 140; John Markoff, Five Giants in
Technology Unite to Deter File Sharing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2004, at C 1.
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tended to lower costs for obtaining content legally. The goal of DRM is
to enable and facilitate legal licensing of digital information by reducing
the transactional costs for consumers to find, access, and use the digital
information they demand. Ease of use has propelled Apple's iTunes
Music Store to become the preeminent legal music download site on the
Internet, causing customers more than a billion times to say "yes" to
"DRMed" music.
3
Much of the debate over DRM so far has focused on these contested
intellectual property issues, in particular on copyright. 4 However, copy-
right is not the only legal claim over information. Privacy rights, for
example, entitle individuals to some control over their personal informa-
tion.5 DRM is generally agnostic as to what kinds of rights over infor-
mation it protects and the transactions of what rights it facilitates, as long
as such rights can be technically incorporated. This, in turn, requires
one, at least at some level, to find common conceptual ground among
such information rights.
This Article argues that DRM may prove useful beyond the narrow
confines of copyright. Part I briefly describes DRM and why and how
DRM can be used to manage rights over information more generally.
Part II maps the elements of DRM systems, with a specific focus on the
meta-data that defines specific usage rights of the DRMed information it
accompanies. Part III looks at non-copyright claims over information, in
particular informational privacy, and evaluates how such claims could be
represented in DRM systems. I put forward a list of advantages such
DRM-based management of informational privacy claims would offer
and lay out three significant challenges and how they could be addressed
for such a DRM system to be successful.
I. THE EMERGENCE OF DRM SYSTEMS
Digital rights management aims to control access to information
content. 6 It does so by covering all phases of access control, from de-
scribing access rights to a certain piece of information, to facilitating
transactions of such rights, to enforcing access control. While DRM
comes in many different kinds and shapes, it needs to be comprehen-
sive-covering all stages of the dissemination and usage process-to
prevent content from being extracted from its protective realm by unau-
thorized parties.
3. Press Release, Apple Computer Inc., iTunes Music Store Downloads Top One Billion
Songs (Feb. 23, 2006), available at http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2006/feb/23itms.html.
4. See generally Symposium, Law and Technology of Digital Rights Management, 18
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 697 (2003); Nicola Lucchi, Intellectual Property Rights in Digital Media, 53
BUFF. L. REv. 1111 (2005).
5. See, e.g., Julie Tuan, Customer Information: U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 15 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 353, 368-69 (2000) (discussing the right to privacy as it relates to personal information).
6. Access control is limited to preventing unauthorized users from access. It also entails
enabling access for those that are authorized. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
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Movies stored on DVDs are a good example. Movie data is already
encrypted when it is transferred on DVD. DVDs are sold with the in-
formation on it encrypted and thus only playable through specific hard-
ware. These DVD players, in turn, must be able to decrypt the movie
information. DVD production, DVDs and DVD players all have to con-
form to the same technical rules on how digital information is being in-
terpreted for DRM to work, and all parties must adhere to these rules for
the system to function.7
Such DRM requires a complex system of technical, organizational
and societal elements. Neither technology nor market incentives alone
will be sufficient, for at least two reasons.
First, many but not necessarily all commercial entities involved in
the dissemination of DRMed content have a strong economic interest to
ensure that the DRM system remains in place. Take the manufacturers
of DVD players, for example. If they were to sell a DVD player that
could "break" the DRM system and permit its users easy duplication of
encrypted data-much like dual-deck music cassette recorders used to
offer-consumers might buy more of these units, creating an economic
incentive for manufacturers of DVD players to defect from the DRM
system.8
Second, consumers will desire to "free ride," that is, to gain access
to DRMed content without paying the appropriate usage fee. To that
end, consumers will want to collect information and methods as well as
tools to break the access control mechanisms of DRM unless societal
rules prevent them from doing so.9
For DRM to work, therefore, the legal system has to stop defections
by commercial entities as well as prevent consumers from gaining and
sharing information about how to break usage restrictions, while ena-
bling and facilitating authorized transactions of usage rights. What usage
7. The most important DRM standard for video DVDs is the "Content Scrambling System"
(CSS), an authentication and encryption system designed to prevent unauthorized copying of DVDs.
See JIM TAYLOR, DVD DEMYSTIFIED 481-85 (2d ed. 2001). This system was hacked in 1999 by
software called DeCSS. See Rob Pegoraro, Hollywood to Home Viewer: We Own You, WASH. POST,
Aug. 25, 2000, at EO 1. For the elaborate next generation of content protection systems, see, for
example, the High-Definition Multimedia Interface (HDMI), an industry-supported standard to
connect any compatible digital audio or video source like a Sony Playstation and a video recorder,
and the respective DRM standard High-Bandwidth Digital Content Protection (HDCP), a lack of
which may lead to video quality and resolution being artificially downgraded. See generally Digital
Content Protection, LLC, http://www.digital-cp.com/home (last visited Sept. 14, 2006). Another
example is Apple's DRM technology FairPlay, which restricts access to digital content on Apple's
products, such as iTunes or the iPod. See Hiawatha Bray, Apple's Music Operation Hits a Sour
Note, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 2, 2004, at C2.
8. See TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 481 (citing the corollary proposition that DVD producers
are not willing to publish DVDs without protection from DRM defecting practices).
9. See Pegoraro, supra note 7, at EO I (citing at least one instance where users have illegally
hacked a DVD encryption system); see also Bill Rosenblatt, iTunes DRM Hacked, Then Hacked
Again, DRM WATCH, Mar. 24, 2005, http://www.drmwatch.com/drntech/article.php/3492676
(discussing hacking of Apple, Inc.'s FairPlay DRM).
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rights, however, are being granted through DRM, no longer need to be a
simple reflection of the legal system. In fact, one can imagine a DRM
system granting its users a very different set of rights than current intel-
lectual property law-especially when compared with fair use rights.1°
As Lawrence Lessig predicted, the authority to delimit these usage
rights shifts from the existing lawmaking and adjudicating institutions in
our society to those in control of the DRM system." The law's task in
such a context is to ensure that such private ordering is not being under-
mined by "leakage" and circumvention. 12 Thus, intellectual property law
turns into an enforcement mechanism for whatever access control ar-
rangements are contained in DRM.
Critics have contended that every DRM system to date has been
broken relatively swiftly, eroding the very foundation on which the entire
idea of access control rests. 13 However, enforcement does not need to be
perfect-it is sufficient if it deters enough to shape the behavior of many
consumers.14 Apple's DRM is a case in point: The use of music bought
through the iTunes Music Store online and downloaded onto one's com-
puter is constrained by a system called FairPlay. 15 It restricts the com-
puter on which the music can be played, the iPod onto which it can be
copied, and how often it can be burnt on a CD. To break out of this
straight-jacket, many tools have been developed and remain available on
the Internet to either strip the music from FairPlay restriction data, or to
otherwise enable the unauthorized sharing of DRMed music content.
10. For an early comparison between intellectual property law and the DRM system envi-
sioned by Ted Nelson's famous System Xanadu, see Pamela Samuelson & Robert J. Glushko, Intel-
lectual Property Rights for Digital Library and Hypertext Publishing Systems, 6 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
237, 239, 247-52 (1993).
11. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS IN CYBERSPACE (1999); see
also Viktor Mayer-Schonberger, In Search of the Story: Narratives of Intellectual Property, 10 VA.
J.L. & TECH. 11, para. 36-40 (2005); Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of
Information Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEx. L. REV. 553, 591-92 (1998); VIKTOR
MAYER-SCHONBERGER, DAS RECHT AM INFO-HIGHWAY 41 (1997).
12. See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES (1991); see also Yochai Benkler, An Unhurried View of Private Ordering in Information
Transactions, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2063, 2078 (2000); Lawrence Friedman, Essay: Digital Communi-
cations Technology and New Possibilities for Private Ordering, 9 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 57,
61-62 (2003); David R. Johnson & David G. Post, And How Shall the Net Be Governed?: A Medita-
tion on the Relative Virtues of Decentralized, Emergent Law, in COORDINATING THE INTERNET 62,
81-90 (Brian Kahin & James H. Keller eds., 1997); Margaret Jane Radin & R. Polk Wagner, The
Myth of Private Ordering: Discovering Legal Realism in Cyberspace, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1295
(1998).
13. See, e.g., John Black, The Impossibility of Technology-Based DRM and a Modest Sugges-
tion, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 387, 396 (2005) (arguing that "the media companies'
reliance on a technological solution is almost certainly doomed, and that a variety of motives will
continue to drive people to circumvent any such technology. The best solution to the problem is not
a technological one, but instead one of education.").
14. See Viktor Mayer-Schonberger, The Shape of Governance: Analyzing the World of Inter-
net Regulation, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 605, 614-16 (2003); see also Jack L. Goldsmith, Regulation of the
Internet: Three Persistent Fallacies, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1119, 1126 (1998); Lawrence Lessig,
The Zones of Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1403, 1405 (1996).
15. See Bray, supra note 7, at C2.
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Creating, disseminating and using such tools may be potentially illegal,
but nevertheless continues to take place. This has not doomed Apple's
DRM system. Despite the widespread availability of such tools at low
transactional costs and the persistence of music sharing peer-to-peer
networks, consumers buy DRMed music from the iTunes Music Store at
a rate of about four million usage restricted songs per week. 16 Consum-
ers are obviously willing to pay a relatively small amount in return for
ease of use, speed of search and download, and assurance of quality.
Less than perfect DRM systems will continue to thrive as long as
content owners deem the revenue generated more important than the
leakages of content that are occurring. Of course, any change in the
value proposition to the consumer-for example by raising prices or
making pricing less transparent-may have an effect on consumer be-
havior, potentially increasing leakage and undermining the DRM system.
This is one reason Apple has a strong incentive to keep iTunes Music
Store's pricing model simple and transparent.
17
DRM is more than a technical fix to prevent unauthorized copying.
As a system, it depends not just on technology, but on institutions and
market incentives, and presupposes law to prevent too much leakage
from happening. While not perfect, DRM systems have been relatively
successful in controlling access and will remain so as long as their value
propositions are attractive. Insofar as DRM systems prescribe acceptable
usage behavior, they replace the legal system as the dominant normative
framework.
II. ELEMENTS OF DRM SYSTEMS AND IMPLICATIONS
In abstract terms, a DRM system consists of both mechanisms for
facilitating authorized transactions and mechanisms for enforcing access
control. The former covers functions like the publishing of DRMed con-
tent, the easy searching for content by consumers, and the processing of
the transaction itself. This may include the creation and management of
online directory services as well as electronic payment. 18 The latter en-
16. Press Release, Apple Computers Inc., iTunes Music Store Downloads Top 150 Million
Songs (Oct. 14, 2004), available at http://www.apple.conpr/library/2004/oct/14itunes.html.
17. The recent clash between Apple and the big music labels over pricing strategies can be
seen against the backdrop of this conflict. See Scott Morrison, Labels Demand a Bite as Apple Calls
the Tune, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 4, 2005, at 11 (citing the music labels' concerns that wholesale
prices should be raised to capture a larger share of the market in which they believe Apple has be-
come too powerful).
18. See Niels Rump, Definition, Aspects, and Overview, in DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT:
TECHNOLOGICAL, ECONOMIC, LEGAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS 3-4 (Eberhard Becker et al. eds.,
2003); see also Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi & Markus Schneider, Electronic Payment Systems, in DIGITAL
RIGHTS MANAGEMENT: TECHNOLOGICAL, ECONOMIC, LEGAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS 113-115
(Eberhard Becker et al. eds., 2003).
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tails mostly technical means to restrict usage of content to certain users,
times, and modes.' 9
Both facilitating transactions and enforcing access control require
the DRM system to authenticate users as well as content, and to incorpo-
rate and respect usage data associated with the specific content users
have acquired.20 The need for authentication has been well documented
and linked to debates on electronic signatures and similar methods of
authenticating messages. 2' The role of usage data-information about
how a particular content may be used-has received less attention al-
though such meta-data is a fundamental element of DRM.22
To perform its role of controlling access, any DRM system must
"know" what kind of usage is permissible by whom, and what usage
attempts must be prevented. This is done through meta-data associated
with content that describes authorized usage.23 If a consumer attempts to
use content in a way that contradicts the usage rights expressed in the
meta-data, the DRM system will attempt to stop her. Consequently, a
DRM system needs to know how to locate such meta-data for any
DRMed content it manages, and most current DRM systems rely on con-
tent to contain or be combined with the relevant meta-data.
Meta-data has to lay out permissible use in a standardized and un-
ambiguous way, so that it can be used by all technical elements of a
DRM system. In recent years, two major attempts got under way to sys-
tematically define meta-data for a very wide spectrum of digital content.
The first one is eXtensible Rights Markup Language (XrML) developed
and owned by commercial entity ContentGuard and based on the "exten-
sible markup language" (XML).2 4 Microsoft employs a version of XrML
in the DRM it uses. 5
19. See Rump, supra note 18, at 30-42.
20. There is significant philosophical debate among DRM providers whether to authenticate
users or usage devices. Most DRM systems discussed in this paper focus on user authentication, but
the Digital Media Project (DMP) instead focuses on device authentication. See Bill Rosenblatt, 2005
Year in Review: DRM Standards, DRM WATCH, Jan. 2, 2006, http://www.drmwatch.com/standards/
article.php/357451 1.
21. See generally LESSIG, supra note 11, at 30-42; L. JEAN CAMP, TRUST AND RISK 1N
INTERNET COMMERCE 36-40 (2000) (pointing to the difficulties of evaluating the reliability of in-
formation online); DAVID BRIN, THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY 179-81, 333-35 (1998) (arguing that in
view of modem surveillance technologies, we should focus more on ensuring accountability, i.e.
reciprocal transparency, than protecting privacy by fostering secrecy).
22. See Stefan Bechtold, Digital Rights Management in the United States and Europe, 52 AM.
J. COMP. L. 323,326-29 (2004).
23. Already more than a decade ago and way ahead of the time, Pam Samuelson and Bob
Glushko wrote eloquently about the need for such meta-data and its implications. See Samuelson &
Glushko, supra note 10, at 252-53.
24. Andrew Conry-Murray, XrML: Defining Digital Rights, IT ARCHITECT, Apr. 5, 2004
http://www.itarchitect.com/shared/article/showArticle.jhtml?articleld=1 8900094.
25. See Stacy Cowley & Paul Roberts, Microsoft Details Rights Management Policy,
NETWORK WORLD, Feb. 21, 2003, http://www.networkworld.com/news/2003/0221microdetai2.html
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Another derivative of XrML is REL, a "rights expression language"
that is part of the MPEG-2 1 standard.26 By adopting REL, the Moving
Picture Experts Group (MPEG) hopes that it will aid in the creation of a
comprehensive DRM for multimedia content. 27 REL in turn uses stan-
dardized terms in describing the usage rights for specific content. These
terms are defined in what is called the Rights Data Dictionary (RDD)
that is being developed under guidance of the International Standardiza-
tion Organization (ISO).28
The RDD, developed by UK-based firm Rightscom Ltd,29 defines
the terms rights holders can use when creating usage meta-data that de-
fines who can do what, with which resource, in what context, at what
time, and in what location. Accordingly, RDD contains semantics for
defining agents, resource, time, place and context (in RDD parlance the
"context model"). 30
While impressive in its structured approach, XrML's long-term sus-
tainability in the market place is an open question. After years of use
Microsoft's version of XrML remains incompatible with MPEG's REL;
and the software giant has no apparent plans to change this. REL on the
other hand has not seen a single implementation by any of the many in-
dustry players that initially praised it, prompting experts to call it "irrele-
vant."
3
The second attempt to standardize meta-data is the Open Digital
Rights Language (ODRL) Initiative, orchestrated by its founder Renato
Iannella.32  ODRL covers the same ground as XrML. Unlike XrML,
however, ODRL stems from an open process and is offered license-free.
It is the open-source pendant to commercial XrML. Not surprisingly,
ODRL has collaborated with Creative Commons (CC) 33 to map CC's
semantics in ODRL.34
(citing John Manferdelli, general manager of the Windows Trusted Platform Technologies group:
"Despite being new, XrML is the richest and best developed of the rights management languages.").
26. See Rosenblatt, supra note 20.
27. See Rightscom Ltd, The MPEG-21 Rights Expression Language 5 (July 14, 2003) (White
Paper), available at, http://www.interactivemusicnetwork.org/documenti/viewdocument.php?
file id=809.
28. See Rosenblatt, supra note 20.
29. Rightscom, http://www.rightscom.com/Default.aspx?tabid=1076 (last visited Sept. 14,
2006).
30. See Susanne Guth, Rights Expression Languages, in DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT:
TECHNOLOGICAL, ECONOMIC, LEGAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS 101, 103-105 (Eberhard Becker et al.
eds., 2003).
31. See Rosenblatt, supra note 20.
32. The Open Digital Rights Language Initiative, http://odrl.net (last visited Sept. 14, 2006).
33. Creative Commons is a non-profit organization that offers flexible copyright licenses for
creative works. See Creative Commons, http://creativecommons.org/ (last visited Sept. 14, 2006).
34. See ODRL Creative Commons Profile, July 6, 2005, http://odrl.net/Profiles/CC/SPEC-
20050706.html.
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ODRL has been successfully used in the area of mobile devices,
where the Open Mobile Alliance (OMA) has adopted it for its DRM,
leading to widespread use in mobile devices in Europe. 35 North Ameri-
can operators on the other hand have so far chosen mostly to use their
own proprietary DRM systems.
36
ODRL's biggest immediate challenge is not technical or economic,
but legal. In what can only be described as a second-order intellectual
property war, ContentGuard, the company that developed XrML, main-
tains that its patents cover any implementation of a rights expression
language and has threatened open, royalty-free ODRL.37 ODRL's pro-
ponents maintain that ContentGuard's wide-reaching patent claims are
baseless.38 Yet, the legal question of who holds intellectual property
rights over the way by which we may semantically describe intellectual
property claims in DRM remains unresolved, thus clouding considerably
ODRL's future.
39
Neither XrML nor ODRL are likely to become the accepted stan-
dard for expressing usage rights in DRM systems any time soon. Not
only does each of them have their own problems, they also have to con-
tend with a growing plethora of proprietary DRM systems advocated by
commercial competitors as well as industry consortia.40 The lack of in-
teroperability between these systems, the high economic stakes involved,
and the entrenchment of leading players-rights holders, consumer elec-
tronics corporations, telecommunication companies and software pro-
ducers-will continue to work against widespread consolidation. 4,
To sum up, DRM systems consist of a number of important ele-
ments to perform two main functions-the facilitation of usage rights
transactions, and the interdiction of unauthorized use. A central element
is the representation of usage rights in the DRM system. It is often
achieved by specifying such rights through a distinct rights expression
35. See Rosenblatt, supra note 20; Open Mobile Alliance, Digital Rights Management 4 (Dec.
2003) (Short Paper), available at http://www.openmobilealliance.org/docs/DRM%20Short%20
Paper/o20DEC%202003%20.pdf; Open Mobile Alliance, Press Release, The Open Mobile Alliance
Shows Growing Industry Impact 1-2 (Oct. 20, 2005), available at http://www.openmobilealliance.
org/docs/AGM2005RlsFINAL.pdf.
36. See Rosenblatt, supra note 20 ("OMA DRM is taking hold primarily in Europe; the stan-
dard's loss of momentum is jeopardizing its chances for adoption across the Pond in North Amer-
ica.").
37. Id. ("One reason for the OMA DRM slowdown has been the still-unresolved wrangling
over DRM patent licensing terms .... ").
38. See Susanne Guth & Renato lannella, Critical Review of MPEG LA Software Patent
Claims, INDICARE, Mar. 23, 2005, http://www.indicare.org/tiki-read article.php?articleld=90 (ques-
tioning the validity of ContentGuard's patents).
39. See id. ("If the claims of MPEG LA are validated, the work of the ODRL Initiative and
other RELs such as the Creative Commons Licenses will be critically endangered.").
40. See Rosenblatt, supra note 20 (mentioning a number of other proprietary standards like
Groovy Mobile and Melodeo in the U.S. and Canada or Cingular's cooperation with Apple's Fair-




language with semantics pre-defined in a (potentially extensible) diction-
ary. Two significant efforts for defining such a rights expression lan-
guage have been undertaken recently-the commercial XrML/REL and
open source license-free ODRL, but neither will likely become the
dominant standard in the medium term, nor will any of the available al-
ternatives. The lack of a common standard, however, does not put in
dispute the central need to represent usage rights in DRM.
III. REPRESENTING RIGHTS IN DRM
To date, DRM systems are used to control access to copyrighted in-
formation content, be it movies, video games, software or music. Tech-
nically, these different types of content are all the same: streams of bits,
with associated meta-data that restrict what can be done with them. As
DRM systems are built to control access to "digital" information, they
are fundamentally rights agnostic-that is, they can in principle restrict
any digital bit stream.
Hence, one could potentially extend such DRM systems to intellec-
tual property rights beyond copyright.42 For example, one could envision
trademark rights to be managed through DRM. If one were to use a
trademarked name or image, the DRM system could facilitate the licens-
ing of such trademarks or prevent their use. Widening the scope of rights
management in such a way would require, however, a significant modifi-
cation of the semantics of usage. So far, these semantics-as evidenced
for example by the Rights Data Dictionary (RDD)-focus on simple uses
of managed content, like printing, displaying, storing or modifying.43
Including trademark rights in DRM would necessitate deepening the
"understanding" that the DRM system has of the context of use: Is the
trademark just mentioned descriptively, or does its use infringe upon the
rights of the trademark holder? Answering this question may require
machines to understand substantially more about the substance of infor-
mation than is currently available. Yet, in a number of instances existing
DRM systems may easily be able to protect trademark rights, just as they
protect copyrights. Take for example the use of logos on web pages: in
such cases the DRM could require (and facilitate) the user to obtain con-
sent from the trademark owner. To be sure, this would not stop some-
body from scanning in a trademarked logo and then using it, but it would
arguably prevent a user from downloading a trademarked logo from the
trademark owner's website to use the same logo on her website, even if
the logo itself were not copyrighted.
42. Although, perhaps with the exception of trademark rights, it is a bit hard to imagine what
these other intellectual property rights could be. Simply put, unlike copyright, patent rights protect
product or process ideas, not just concrete instantiations of these ideas. Thus, it is hard to see what
bit stream a DRM intent upon protecting patents rights would control and how.
43. See Rosenblatt, supra note 20.
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Intellectual property is but one right over information our legal sys-
tem recognizes. DRM systems could potentially be used to manage other
rights over information. Given how much we expose personal informa-
tion on the Internet and the extent to which this exposure is abused, one
obvious candidate for such an extension could be informational pri-
vacy-the management and protection of personal information.
A. Advantages of DRM-Based Protection of Personal Privacy
At least at first blush, such protection of informational privacy
through a DRM system seems to be a useful idea for a number of rea-
sons.
First, the Internet has made processes less transparent. With com-
plex information processing in our computers, protecting personal infor-
mation is less obvious to users than before. A DRM system would take
care of this complexity of information flows for users-providing users
with options without exposing them to the underlying complexity.
Second, due to the abundance and affordability of digital processing
and storage, we capture, process and store much more information about
ourselves-from photos and movies to financial transactions - compared
with pre-digital times with its specialized equipment and relatively ex-
pensive storage costs, thereby increasing the footprint of our individual
digital shadows. 44 With DRM built into all devices that acquire, store
and process information, this surge in stored information of personal
character would not necessarily translate into an equal increase in per-
sonal vulnerability.
Third, even without our expressed wish, information processing
equipment we use-from personal computers to cell phones-acquire
and store much more information about our interactions than ever be-
fore-much of which may represent personal information to which we
would like to control access. 45 A DRM system would enable us to do so.
44. See, e.g., Chip Walter, Kryder's Law, SCIENTIFIC AM., Aug. 2005, available at
http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?articlelD=000BOC22-0805-12D8-
BDFD834l4B7F0000&ref-sciam (arguing that Moore's law about "the doubling of processor speed
every 18 months is a snail's pace compared with rising hard-disk capacity" and stating that "[s]ince
the introduction of the disk drive in 1956, the density of information it can record has swelled from a
paltry 2,000 bits to 100 billion bits (gigabits), all crowded in the small space of a square inch.").
45. A recent victim of this lack of control over one's personal information has been socialite
Paris Hilton, whose cell phone was allegedly hacked. See John Schwartz, Some Sympathy for Paris
Hilton, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2005, § 4, at 1. More generally, malware, spyware, hacking, and other
attacks on communications devices has dramatically increased over the last couple of years - includ-
ing the hundreds of thousands of computers in the U.S. alone that are hijacked and remote-controlled
from abroad. See, e.g., CERT/CC Statistics 1988-2006, http://www.cert.org/stats/ (last visited Sept.
14, 2006) (stating that the number of reported attacks against intemet-connected systems has in-
creased from 21,756 in 2000 to 137,529 in 2003). For a more detailed analysis, see Jonathan L.
Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1974, 2008-13 (2006).
[Vol. 84:1
BEYOND COPYRIGHT
Fourth, the original thrust of protecting personal information in the
United States stemmed from the fears of a "Big Brother"-like, overarch-
ing (federal) government.46 Born out of the shadow of the Watergate
scandal, the Federal Privacy Act 47 therefore protects citizens from intru-
sion by the federal government.48 At least since the advent of the Inter-
net and electronic commerce, consumers have come to realize that com-
mercial entities may threaten their privacy just like governments. In con-
trast to the European privacy landscape, U.S. federal legislators so far
have not enacted an omnibus data protection statute that covers the pri-
vate sector as well. 49 A DRM system could address this problem by em-
powering people to control access to their personal information regard-
less of whether the party attempting such access is a government agency
or a commercial entity.
Fifth, unlike copyright laws that have been harmonized around the
world through a century of international treaties, informational privacy
statutes, despite some international coordination like the OECD Guide-
lines on the Protection of Personal Data, have not seen a similar har-
monization.50 In particular, in the United States, informational privacy
rights remain a patchwork of state and federal laws, making it possible
for personal information to be exported with the help of the Internet to a
jurisdiction with less stringent privacy laws.5  This leads to legal arbi-
46. See COLIN J. BENNETT, REGULATING PRIVACY - DATA PROTECTION AND PUBLIC POLICY
IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES vii (1992); DAVID H. FLAHERTY, PROTECTING PRIVACY IN
SURVEILLANCE SOCIETIES - THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, SWEDEN, FRANCE, CANADA,
AND THE UNITED STATES xiii (1989); Viktor Mayer-Sch6nberger, Generational Development of
Data Protection in Europe, in TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY: THE NEW LANDSCAPE 219, 221 (Philip
E. Agre & Marc Rotenberg eds., 1997).
47. Federal Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a (West 2006).
48. See PAUL M. SCHWARTZ & JOEL R. REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW 92 (1996) ("The
Privacy Act represents the most comprehensive attempt to structure information processing within
the public sector.").
49. There are, however, a number of rather specific sectoral omnibus data protection statutes,
such as the Video Rental Record Protection Act (18 U.S.C.A. § 2710 (West 2006)), the Drivers
Privacy Protection Act (18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2721-25 (West 2006)), the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1320d, 1320d-1 - 1320d-8 (West 2006)), or the Right to Finan-
cial Privacy Act (12 U.S.C.A. §§ 3401-3403 (West 2006)). See also SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG,
supra note 48, at 215-18 (giving a brief overview of data protection in the private sector in the U.S.).
50. Organization for Co-Operation and Economic Development (OECD), OECD Guidelines
on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data,
http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,2340,en_2649_34255_1815186_1 1_1 1,00.html (last visited
Sept. 14, 2006). Harmonization has therefore taken place to a certain degree. However, in the
European Union this was largely due to the European Union Data Protection Directive. See EU
Directive 95/46/EC on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data
and on the Free Movement of such Data, Oct. 24, 1995, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice-home/fsj/privacy/law/indexen.htm [hereinafter Data Directive].
51. While there is no comprehensive and homogeneous body of privacy law at the federal
level in the U.S., informational privacy is protected to varying degrees by rather diverse state laws.
See SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 48, at 129-30 ("[N]o two states have adopted precisely
the same system of regulation."). This is one of the reasons why the European communities linked
the export of personal data to third countries to the requirement of a certain minimum level of pro-
tection. See Data Directive Art. 25, supra note 50 ("The Member States shall provide that the trans-
fer to a third country of personal data which are undergoing processing or are intended for process-
ing after transfer may take place only if, without prejudice to compliance with the national provi-
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trage-a modem form of "forum shopping., 52  A DRM system would
have global reach and work largely independently of the jurisdiction it is
being used in, thereby overcoming the arbitrage problem.53
Sixth, and related, entrusting a DRM system to protect our informa-
tional privacy would not necessitate the passage of a comprehensive digi-
tal privacy law, which legislative priorities as well as federalism con-
cems in the United States may preclude. As DRM relies on law to stop
leakages from occurring too frequently, a relatively simple amendment to
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) 54 prohibiting tampering
with DRM systems in general (and not just in the context of intellectual
property rights) could suffice.
Because of the potential of DRM systems to address these privacy
challenges, DRMing personal information may possibly offer all of us
better individual control over our personal information than current pri-
vacy law does.
B. Three Challenges to DRMing Informational Privacy
To achieve success, however, at least three issues exist-one tech-
nical, one foundational, and one conceptual-that may prevent us from
using DRM in the personal privacy context.
1. The Technical Challenge
As I have described above, DRM systems depend on meta-data of
permissible use that is linked to the content to which the meta-data re-
fers. 55 This linkage has to be hard to break, because once separation hap-
pens, content essentially loses its protective cover and can no longer be
protected by DRM. A number of technical methods are used by DRM
systems to ensure the linkage between (as well as the integrity of) meta-
data and content. For example, meta-data can be "embedded" in content,
sions adopted pursuant to the other provisions of this Directive, the third country in question ensures
an adequate level of protection."). Subsequently, an EU delegation negotiated with the U.S. De-
partment of Commerce the so-called safe-harbor principles. See U.S. Department of Commerce,
Safe Harbor, http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/index.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2006).
52. See A. Michael Froomkin, The Internet as a Source of Regulatory Arbitrage, in BORDERS
IN CYBERSPACE 129, 140-50 (Brian Kahin & Charles Nesson eds., 1997); Viktor Mayer-
Schonberger, The Shape of Governance: Analyzing the World of Internet Regulation, 43 VA. J. INT'L
L. 605, 615 (2003); see also Joel Trachtman, Cyberspace, Sovereignty, Jurisdiction, and Modernism,
5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 561, 577 (1998) ("One dark side of cyberspace is its facilitation of
private sector jurisdictional evasion and, at least in some contexts, its facilitation of regulatory arbi-
trage."); Sean Selin, Comment, Governing Cyberspace: The Need for an International Solution, 32
GONZ. L. REv. 365, 381-82 (1996) (speaking of the "lowest common denominator" that would result
in such regulatory arbitrage).
53. To be sure, as I have mentioned above, technology requires laws to prohibit the creation
and use of tools to break technological locks. In the absence of supportive laws one could overcome
the restrictions the DRM system imposes without breaking the law. However, even in these situa-
tions, one could imagine contract law to take over some of the role of the (inexistent) laws.
54. Digital Millennium Copyright Act § 103, 17 U.S.C.A. § 1201 (West 2006).
55. See supra text accompanying notes 20-28.
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using mechanisms like steganography 56 and encryption. 57  As a rule of
thumb, employing these methods is easier when the amount of meta-data
is relatively small compared with the content that needs to be protected.
This is the case with multimillion-pixel photographs, megabyte-sized
music files, or videos measured in gigabytes.
Unfortunately, personal information is much smaller. Our social
security number is only nine digits in length, all of which are numbers.
In such cases the meta-data defining permissible usage would be substan-
tially bigger than the informational content it intends to protect, requiring
DRM system builders to fundamentally adjust their systems, while steg-
anography and similar methods of "hiding" and "embedding" meta-data
would have to be replaced by more robust mechanisms that work without
depending on a relative size difference between meta-data and protected
content.
Yet, providers of DRM systems may have to face this challenge re-
gardless of whether we want to include personal information or not. As
digital creators continue to combine and modify pre-existing elements to
build new works, the notion of the individual creator producing a mono-
lithic creative work is rapidly substituted by ideas of peer production,
John Seely Brown's creative bricolages, and a modus operandi of "rip,
mix, and bum., 58 Providers of DRM systems will have to contend with
this brave new world of intellectual production, in which individual crea-
tive elements that are assembled, combined, and mixed, may get smaller
and smaller in size. If that is the case, the problem of linking smaller
pieces of information with its meta-data that I have described above may
get solved anyway.
2. The Foundational Challenge
For a DRM system to be comprehensive and effective in managing
personal information rights it needs to keep track of what users are doing
when, how, and in what context.59 Consequently, in order to protect the
privacy of individuals, a DRM system needs to keep track of every-
body's every move, thus creating a system of total surveillance.
56. Steganography is "the act of embedding or hiding a message inside a seemingly innocent
digital vessel" so that nobody except for the recipient knows of its existence. See J. William Gurley,
From Wired to Wiretapped: Forget Privacy Rights. The Real Problem With Government Net Snoop-
ing is That it Won't Work, FORTUNE, Oct. 15, 2001, at 214.
57. See SIMSON GARFINKEL & GENE SPAFFORD, WEB SECURITY AND COMMERCE 187-208
(Deborah Russel ed., 1997) (referring to the process of converting a plaintext message into a suppos-
edly unintelligible ciphertext by using an encryption algorithm, i.e. a mathematical equation).
58. For a comprehensive analysis of social production as a new paradigm, see generally
YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: How SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS
MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006).
59. See generally Richard Gooch, Requirements for DRM Systems, in DIGITAL RIGHTS
MANAGEMENT: TECHNOLOGICAL, ECONOMIC, LEGAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS 16 (Eberhard
Becker et al. eds., 2003) (providing a general overview of the requirements of an effective DRM
system).
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Inherent in this perplexing situation is the notion that such DRM
systems need to be tracking comprehensively in order to be effective.6 °
Yet, as I have discussed above, DRM systems do not need to offer per-
fect, but only sufficient enforcement. 61 Limited leakage is not detrimen-
tal as long as most individuals continue to choose transacting through
DRM rather than circumventing it.
The problem of leakage, however, might become more difficult the
smaller and more fluid the informational content DRM intends to protect.
Leakage of a multi-gigabyte movie file may be less troublesome, because
distributing such a file at current transmission speeds carries non-trivial
transactional costs. 62 Such costs are practically non-existent for a piece
of personal information that just contains a person's name and social
security number. Sending and receiving such information across the
Internet takes milliseconds. Therefore, one could argue that the smaller
the information pieces DRM systems have to protect, the more compre-
hensive such systems must become.
Yet, such a view presupposes that transaction costs stay constant.
The more bandwidth users will have at their disposal, the lower the
transaction costs for transferring even large pieces of information. As
providers of DRM will adapt their systems to a high bandwidth world,
for example by building the capacity to "forget" into our digital systems,
such leakage could be controlled effectively.
3. The Conceptual Challenge
Existing DRM systems incorporate a semantic of property. This is
not surprising considering that they are designed to protect copyright.
The dictionaries they employ-for example the RDD-are based on
property-related actions, like "sell." The legal foundation of informa-
tional privacy claims, on the other hand, is based on a negative liberty, a
right to keep others out.63 It is not conceptualized in terms of permission




63. See, e.g., Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 193 (1890) (the seminal article that became the basis of the right to privacy in the U.S.). Legal
academics have argued since for different notions of privacy. Charles Fried equates informational
privacy with control over information. See Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 483 (1968).
Paul Schwartz argued for a concept based on informational self-determination. See Paul M.
Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 1653 (1999). Julie
Cohen suggested individual autonomy as a foundation for privacy. See Julie E. Cohen, Examined
Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1373, 1423 (2000). Both
Schwartz's and Cohen's approach are instantiations of essentially European, if not German notions
of informational privacy. See Spiros Simitis, Reviewing Privacy in an Information Society, 135 U.
PA. L. REv. 707 (1987); Mayer-Schonberger, supra note 46, at 229-32. Categorizing these and
similar conceptions of informational privacy, Daniel Solove has identified six main themes: the right
to be let alone, limited access to self, secrecy, informational control, personhood, and intimacy. See
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This results in a mismatch between the semantics available in cur-
rent DRM systems and the conception of the claim-informational pri-
vacy-we intend to incorporate. There are two options to overcome this
divergence.
First, one could adjust our conception of informational privacy to
conform to the property paradigm already built into DRM systems; that
is one could change the law to fit the technology. As long as the relation
between humans and information can be represented in terms of owner-
ship and property, such "propertized" informational privacy claims could
be included in existing DRM systems.
"Propertizing" information privacy is not a novel idea. Experts from
Kenneth Laudon to Lawrence Lessig have suggested it before.64 They
argue that while our legal system has not conceived of informational
privacy as a property right, markets have. Personal information has be-
come a valuable commodity that is traded once it has been collected.
Hence, using property as a legal foundation for informational privacy
would arguably bring the legal system in line with economic reality, with
the benefit of empowering the original source of personal information-
the individual herself. Such "propertization" of personal information
could then provide the conceptual foundation that enables DRM systems
to manage access to such information, thereby potentially-as Lessig
contends-enabling the individual to decide whether and to what extent
to trade away her privacy interests in personal information.65
Yet, as has been pointed out, such a reconceptualization of informa-
tional privacy is not without significant problems.66 First, copyright and
patent rights are granted to offer an individual economic incentive for the
production of creative works to overcome potential underproduction of
Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1094 (2002). None of these
privacy conceptions, however, is founded on a property paradigm similar to copyright.
64. See Kenneth C. Laudon, Markets and Privacy, 39 COMM. OF THE ACM 92 (1996);
LESSIG, supra note 11, at 122-134; Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of Privacy, 1 VAND. J. ENT.
L. & PRAC. 56, 58 (1999); see also Patricia Mell, Seeking Shade in a Land of Perpetual Sunlight:
Privacy as Property in the Electronic Wilderness, II BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 26-41 (1996); Richard
S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic Defense of Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J.
2381, 2381 (1996); Edward Janger, Privacy Property, Information Costs, and the Anticommons, 54
HASTINGS L.J. 899, 900 (2003); Jerry Kang & Benedikt Buchner, Privacy in Atlantis, 18 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 230, 267 (2004); Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 2055, 2058 (2004).
65. See LESSIG, supra note 11, at 156-62. But see Andrew Orlowski, Lessig, Stallman on
"Open Source" DRM, THE REGISTER, Apr. 15, 2006, at 1, available at
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2006/04/15/lessigstallman drm.
66. See Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1136-
46 (2000); Marc Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of Privacy (What Larry
Doesn't Get), 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, § 2 (2001); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Warren &
Brandeis Redux: Finding (More) Privacy Protection in Intellectual Property Lore, 1999 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 8, 12; Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1193, 1193 (1998); Janger, supra note 64, at 914-16.
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such works.67 This is different for personal information, which arguably
is not underproduced.68 Second, intellectual property laws in the United
States are designed, as the Constitution states in unambiguous terms, to
advance the public good through the advancement of science and the
arts.69 There is no such utilitarian rationale in facilitating the dissemina-
tion of personal information. 70 Third, propertization is anathema to those
that conceptualize informational privacy in terms of individual autonomy
and dignity.7' Fourth, certain uses of a creative work after its copyright
had been sold may infuriate the creator, but unlike personal information
will not threaten her persona.
72
Moreover, our traditional notion of creative works is atomistic:
Creative works stand on their own; they may shape (at least in part) the
context they are put in, not vice versa. For example, one can read a
Shakespeare play, or a Beckett novel on the beach, in the subway, or in a
library-it, we assume, rises above the context in which it is read. Con-
sequently, in most cases creators have little interest in dictating where we
consume their creations. This is different in the realm of personal infor-
mation. The use of personal information in one context may be perfectly
benign and acceptable to the individual the information refers to, but use
in a different context may have serious negative consequences for that
person.73 Through the act of propertization, the originator loses control
of her personal information and cannot stop it from being used by others
who have legitimately obtained "ownership" rights over it.
67. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 13 (2003).
68. See Kang, supra note 66, at 1193 n.237; see also Murphy, supra note 64, at 2383; see also
Samuelson, supra note 66, at 1139.
69. U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8 (stipulating that "Congress shall have power ... to promote the
progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to author and inventors the exclu-
sive right to their respective writings and discoveries.").
70. See Samuelson, supra note 66, at 1140-41.
71. See Kang & Buchner, supra note 64, at 234-36; see also Samuelson, supra note 66, at
1142-43.
72. See Rotenberg, supra note 66, at § 93 (noting that Warren & Brandeis in their seminal
paper on privacy "purposefully distinguished a privacy right from an intellectual property claim,
noting that copyright typically protects an interest once publication occurs, privacy protects a right to
simply not publish"); see also Samuelson, supra note 66, at 1138 (stating "[flree alienability works
very well in the market for automobiles and land, but it is far from clear that it will work well for
information privacy. An individual may be willing to sell his data to company N for purpose S, but
he may not wish to give N rights to sell these data to M").
73. An extreme example is offered by the development in the 1930s in the Netherlands of a
comprehensive population registration system. The objective of the system echoes some of the
rationales for more sophisticated information technologies today-to streamline administration and
to reduce burdens on citizens. That system, however, was subsequently used to assist the Nazis in
apprehending Dutch Jews and Gypsies, who suffered a much higher death rate than any other occu-
pied western European country, or, notably, Jewish refugees in the Netherlands, who were not in the
registration system. See William Seltzer & Margo Anderson, The Dark Side of Numbers: The Role
of Population Data Systems in Human Rights Abuses, 68 SOCIAL RESEARCH 2 (2001); see also
David Lazer & Viktor Mayer-Schonberger, Statutory Frameworks for Regulating Information
Flows: Drawing Lessons for the DNA Data Banks from other Government Data Systems, 34 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 366, 368 (2006).
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Proponents of DRMing personal information may rebut that the
dangers of de- and re-contextualization are not unique to personal infor-
mation. In fact, they could argue, the more we tend to combine, modify
and adapt creative works in digital bricolages, the less such creative
works are able to evoke their own individual context. Creators conse-
quently will desire to retain more control over the contexts in which their
creative works are being used, moving away from the property notion
underlying current DRM systems. In turn, this may force DRM systems
to augment their underlying structure of usage rights to include context-
granted a very tall order, given the current state of technologies.
A second, possibly more sensible option is the reverse; to make
technology follow the law, by altering DRM systems to include non-
property based concepts. This is relatively straightforward as long as it
can be achieved by adjusting the semantics of rights expressed in DRM.
Relevant dictionaries, like the RDD, would be modified, thereby making
way for the inclusion of informational privacy into DRM systems. Yet,
it is uncertain that such a simple semantic "patch" can be sufficient, for
the concept of property not only rests on semantics, but on how we con-
strue the relations between humans and information. In a property
framework, such a relation is constructed in terms of a subject/object
relationship of exclusive ownership and control. If, however, our con-
ception of informational privacy is built on an alternative conceptualiza-
tion of the linkage between humans and information, if, to quote Julie
Cohen's words, in informational privacy the "subject" is the "object,, 74 a
simple semantic modification of DRM is no longer feasible.
This is not to suggest that Cohen's conception of informational pri-
vacy is the most appropriate one. Rather, it is precisely the absence of a
prevalent conception of informational privacy-unlike the property-
inspired orthodoxy of copyright-that makes it so difficult to adjust
DRM systems to. If we fail to agree on a conception of the right we
want to protect, how can we hope to express this conception in code, i.e.
in standardized, relatively unambiguous language? And even if we had
such an agreed-upon conception of informational privacy we would have
to incorporate it into a DRM system in addition to the conception of
copyright that is already mapped in our DRM systems. How would these
two presumably very different conceptions coexist? Would such a DRM
system use one common or two separate dictionaries expressing the vari-
ous elements of usage rights and relations between user, rights holder,
and information?
The obvious, but conceptually complex solution, of course, is to
suggest a common structure of rights over information that is able to
represent a variety of different rights over information, from copyright to
74. Cohen, supra note 63, at 1373.
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privacy.75 Given the pitfalls of other solutions, investing serious thought
into conceptualizing such a common structure seems the most promising
long-term solution.
CONCLUSION
This article examined DRM systems and their capacity to manage
not just copyrights but also other kinds of rights over information. In
particular, I looked at whether, to what extent and under what conditions
informational privacy rights could be managed through DRM. I dis-
cussed a number of advantages of DRMing informational privacy rights,
and presented three significant challenges to its adoption-a technical, a
foundational, and a conceptual one-and suggested possible paths to
address them.
While these hurdles are significant and it is not clear whether and
when they can be cleared, it is in the DRM system providers' best inter-
est to broaden the scope of the systems they use, not only because it wid-
ens the market, but also because empowering individuals to better man-
age their informational privacy rights may in turn bring about a public
reassessment of the value DRIVI systems offer.
75. Finding such common ground may be easier in the continental European context. See
VIKTOR MAYER-SCHONBERGER, INFORMATION UND REcHT (2001).
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